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TRADEMARKS AND THE INTERNET:
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL IP
DISPUTES BY UNILATERAL
APPLICATION OF U.S. LAWS
Richard L. Garnett*
I. INTRODUCTION

I

n this Symposium, we have had contributions from a number of scholars addressing the issue of how to resolve
transnational, intellectual property (IP) disputes. According to
one view, the development of internationally accepted principles
of both jurisdiction and applicable law would assist courts in
selecting a single forum and governing law in an IP dispute.1 It
is hoped that such an approach would achieve uniform outcomes from national courts with respect to a single set of facts.
A more direct solution to transnational IP disputes might be to
harmonize the national substantive laws themselves, so that
each state applies the same law of, for example copyright, regardless of where the events occurred or the nationality of the
parties.2 In the case of territorially delimited IP rights, however, harmonization of domestic law is only a partial remedy
because of the competing national interests involved.3

* Associate Professor, Law School, The University of Melbourne, Australia. The author is an Adviser to the American Law Institute in its project on
transnational intellectual property adjudication and is also a member of the
Australian Government delegation to the Hague Conference on Private International Law (Convention on Choice of Court Agreements).
1
See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTES (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2005) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES, Draft
No. 3]. The Brooklyn Law School Symposium focused on Preliminary Draft
No. 3, which was made available to the participants in October 2004.
2. JAMES J. FAWCETT & PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 460 (1998).
3. For example, even if Australia and the United States had identical
trademark laws, the fact that each country grants its own trademark right for
its sphere of territorial operation means that two rights-holders, one under
U.S. law and one under Australian law, would still conflict when one rightsholder seeks to use its mark in the other’s territory.
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What may be needed, more dramatically, is the creation of a
single, transnational, IP right similar to the European Union
(EU) Community Trademark4 and the proposed EU Community
Patent.5 Outside of Europe, however, there has been little progress towards this objective. In fact, the current differences in
national trademark laws suggest that achievement of such a
goal in the near future is unlikely.
Recently, however, other forces of convergence have emerged
in the area of intellectual property. First, the placement of IP
matters within the treaty framework of the World Trade Organization, via the development of multinational panels to review member compliance with the TRIPS Agreement,6 is likely
to have a harmonizing effect on domestic laws.7 Second, the
emergence of borderless information technology has challenged
the notion of regulation by disparate domestic laws that, at
least with respect to IP, are often territorial in application. In
particular, the volume and intensity of transnational conflicts
has increased with the rise of the Internet, and these disputes
are exposing the inadequacy of existing domestic IP laws.8
The object of this paper is to explore a “third path” between
the conflict of laws and harmonization approaches, which can
be described as the unilateral application of domestic law to
4. Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community
Trademark 1994 O.J. (L 1) 1.
5. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, COM(00)412 final at 177.
6. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
7. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL
DISPUTES 20 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2004) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES,
Draft No. 2].
8. International arbitration mechanisms are emerging to address this
inadequacy. See, e.g., Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers [hereinafter ICANN], Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy,
available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (Oct. 24,
1999) [hereinafter UDRP] (under which approved arbitration panels apply a
form of supra-national law not necessarily tied to any domestic legal system).
December 1, 1999 marked the first day that complaints could be lodged under
the policy. ICANN, Timeline for the Formulation and Implementation of the
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, available at http://www.
icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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transnational disputes. The context in which unilateralism has
been most manifest is in the area of Internet trademark disputes; this will be the focus of the present discussion.9 In particular, I argue that a unilateralist approach, as evidenced by
the U.S. application of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) of 1999,10 is appropriate in cases involving
cyber-piracy, but not in situations where only good faith use of a
trademark is involved. In Part II, I briefly discuss general jurisdictional and applicable law issues and review some preACPA decisions. Part III looks at the application of ACPA in
two contexts: cyber-piracy cases and those cases involving a
good faith use of a trademark right. This Article then concludes
with a discussion of the U.S. treatment of foreign rightsholders.
It is important to clarify what is meant by “unilateralism” in
this Article. The idea here is that courts apply national trademark or unfair competition law to disputes with a substantial
foreign element, without adequate regard for, or consideration
of, the dispute’s transnational nature. While traditional conflict
of laws analysis imposes preconditions and restraints at both
the jurisdictional and applicable law stages, under a unilateralist approach, there are minimal hurdles imposed. Many national conflict of laws systems are premised, at least in part, on
respect for the adjudicative competence and territorial sovereignty of other states.11 Accordingly, the jurisdictional and applicable law principles of most countries attempt to accommodate the interests of foreign states and defendants, while preserving the interests of the forum state and its local residents.12
9. While the presence of unilateralism in the area of Internet trademark
disputes may simply be a reflection of the volume of such cases in recent
years, it may also be part of a broader trend that will appear in other contexts.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1999) (Section 1125 is generally referred to as the
Lanham Act).
11. See 1 ALBERT V. DICEY & JOHN H.C. MORRIS, DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 5–7 (Lawrence Collins ed., 13th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
DICEY & MORRIS] (describing concept of “comity”). The idea that a court
should apply the law or seek the jurisdiction with the “closest connection” to
the parties and the dispute has been increasingly influential in jurisdiction
and applicable law doctrine in Europe and the United States. See EUGENE F.
SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 114 (3rd ed. 2000) [hereinafter
SCOLES & HAY].
12. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 11, at 4–5.
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It follows, therefore, that it would be inappropriate for a national court to simply assume jurisdiction, or apply local law in
a transnational case, without adequately assessing the relevant
foreign interests.
In the context of transnational Internet disputes involving
trademarks, however, courts and legislatures have, on occasion,
sought to apply domestic law without the usual preconditions or
restraints imposed to protect foreign interests.13 The application of ACPA by U.S. courts is one such example of this kind of
unilateralism.14 The consequences of such an approach are twofold. First, trademark laws of certain states are likely to have a
wide, possibly global, impact at the expense of other states,
whose capacity to apply their own laws and protect their own
citizens is restrained. In effect, a supranational trademark regime may be created, not pursuant to a transnational process of
harmonization but, rather, due to unilateral national action.
Second, such action may inspire retaliation by other states as
they also choose to abandon their jurisdictional and applicable
law methodologies in favor of direct, unilateral application of
local laws to cases with a foreign element. These consequences
would have a seriously detrimental effect on the global trademark system as a whole.
A. The Kinds of Transnational Disputes that Arise from the Use
of Trademarks on the Internet
A common factual context which has given rise to this problem is where a local plaintiff, who is the holder of trademark
rights under the law of the forum state, brings an action
against a foreign party who has no physical presence in the forum. The foreign-based party operates an Internet Web site,
typically hosted on a foreign server, that uses the plaintiff’s
mark in the text of its site and/or as its domain name. The fo13. Note that the problem of the clash between domestic trademark laws
and the global Internet domain name system has been discussed widely in the
scholarly literature. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Essay: (National)
Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain Name System, 21 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 495 (2000).
14. It should be noted, however, that evidence of this unilateral tendency is
not confined to the practice of the United States and, even in those legal systems where evidence of the approach is found, it is not an approach that is
consistently or universally applied.
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rum court is confronted with two questions in this context:
whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant and, if so, what law to apply to the action. While both inquiries have the capacity to recognize and accommodate foreign
interests, in a number of cases, these interests are diminished.
In considering the degree to which national courts should
take into account foreign interests in Internet trademark litigation, it is helpful to identify a number of variations on the broad
example given above. The first situation is where a plaintiff
and defendant are each using the same or similar mark on the
Internet within their specific national territories, under the
protection of local trademark law, and are separately targeting
a predominantly local customer audience. A second variation is
where the plaintiff and defendant are using the same mark,
again protected by local law in their respective places of residence but one party (or both) is soliciting customers outside its
borders in order to establish an international market for its
products. A third situation is where the defendant is using an
internationally-known mark on the Internet, either with the
intent to exploit the plaintiff’s goodwill for the benefit of its own
business or to merely extort money from the trademark owner;
this is the classic “cybersquatting” situation.
In considering the application of domestic rules of personal
jurisdiction and applicable law in Internet trademark cases, it
is important to distinguish between the differing factual matrices referred to above. A more unilateral or expansive approach
to applying national law with less regard for foreign interests is
arguably more defensible in the case of a person using a mark
for cybersquatting than in the case of a person using the mark,
in good faith, in predominantly local trade. Consequently,
while it will be argued in this Article that foreign interests and
elements should be taken into account in Internet trademark
litigation, not all interests are entitled to the same degree of
deference.
II. FIRST THINGS FIRST: JURISDICTION AND TERRITORIAL SCOPE
A. Personal Jurisdiction in Internet Cases
In the United States, there is evidence of both unilateralism
and restraint in cases involving trademark and unfair competition claims arising from Internet activity. A clear example of
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U.S. restraint is the test used by U.S. courts to determine personal jurisdiction in Internet disputes.15
U.S. courts recognize two broad categories of personal jurisdiction in suits against foreign defendants, namely, “specific”
and “general” jurisdiction.16 Regarding specific jurisdiction in
the Internet context, a defendant will be found to have the requisite “minimum contacts” if it purposefully directed electronic
activity into the state with the intent of engaging in business or
other interactions with forum residents.17 Mere establishment
of an interactive Web site, through which the defendant has the
capacity to exchange information with forum residents is insufficient; there must be a clear intention to target and solicit customers from such persons.18
This test has generally proven effective in protecting foreign
defendants in Internet trademark cases from excessive exposure to U.S. liability. For example, in a recent Third Circuit
decision, Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A.,19 a Spanish company was found not to have targeted residents in New Jersey
where the content of its Web site was entirely in Spanish, prices
were in Pesetas or Euros, merchandise could only be shipped to

15. It is not the purpose of this Article to examine in detail the law on personal jurisdiction but, rather, to demonstrate that the current U.S. jurisdictional tests are protective of the rights of foreign defendants and of the “adjudicative space” of foreign tribunals.
16. Specific jurisdiction is based on the “minimum contacts” between the
defendant’s actions and the forum state. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 480 U.S. 102, 108–09 (1987). General jurisdiction exists, regardless of the cause of action, where the defendant is engaged in “continuous and
systematic” activity in the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom.,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
17. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714
(4th Cir. 2002); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890
(6th Cir. 2002); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1999)
(passive Web site insufficient for personal jurisdiction); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997) (same as Mink).
18. See ALS Scan, Inc., 293 F.3d at 714. For the contrary view that the
mere availability and use of an interactive, transaction-oriented Web site is
sufficient for personal jurisdiction, see Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp.,
293 F.3d 506, 510–13 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
19. See generally Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir.
2003).
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addresses within Spain, and it was not possible for U.S. residents to register with the defendant’s online club.20
Another basis for specific jurisdiction under U.S. law is the
“effects” test, which provides that a U.S. court may exercise jurisdiction where a foreign defendant intentionally aims its conduct at the forum state.21 This test has been applied in the
Internet trademark context by the Ninth Circuit to secure jurisdiction over a defendant who registered a trademark belonging to a plaintiff as a domain name, and then tried to sell it
back to the company in an extortive fashion.22 Such clear and
deliberate cyber-piracy was considered by the court to have
been intentionally directed at the forum state.23 This basis of
jurisdiction is likely to be most useful in the case of abusive or
bad faith uses of a mark.
U.S. law also recognizes personal jurisdiction over foreign entities where “general” jurisdiction is found to exist. In this
situation, the plaintiff’s claim may be unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Consequently, a more onerous
test applies than for specific jurisdiction; namely, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant has “continuous and systematic”
contacts with the forum.24 Satisfaction of such a test in the
Internet context will require a defendant to have clearly targeted forum residents with its Web site, such as where the defendant engaged in business with such persons and entered into
contracts there.25
B. Territorial Scope of the Applicable Law
Once a U.S. court has determined that personal jurisdiction
exists in an action involving foreign entities, it must then decide
which law to apply in adjudicating the dispute. In the context
of general torts, many U.S. courts apply a version of the “interests analysis” doctrine, that is, they identify the state that has
the greatest interest in having its law applied to the particular

20. Id. at 454.
21. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984).
22. Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).
23. Id.
24. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411–12.
25. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003);
Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2003).
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issue and weigh the competing entitlements of the other state.26
In theory, U.S. law would only apply where the court found that
the U.S. interest prevailed over that of the foreign state.
In trademark litigation, however, this traditional approach
for selecting the applicable law has not been followed. Instead,
where a plaintiff seeks relief for trademark infringement under
the Lanham Act,27 courts examine whether the case fits within
the territorial scope of the Act, rather than follow a choice of
law analysis.28 Consequently, the only law that is relevant before the court is the Lanham Act, which is either found to apply,
or not, as a matter of statutory construction.
It is not entirely clear why traditional applicable law analysis
has been avoided by U.S. courts in the trademark context, although writers have noted that this is consistent with the approach taken in other countries based on the concept of lex loci
protectionis (the law of the place where protection is claimed).29
Pursuant to this view, courts are directed in IP cases to apply
the law invoked by the plaintiff to the exclusion of any other
possible law. Such an approach, however, does not necessarily
mean that foreign elements and interests cannot be considered
in the inquiry. It would only be, for example, where U.S. courts
were to apply the Lanham Act to the conduct of a foreign defendant, with little or no link to the United States, that claims of
excessive unilateralism could be made.
The historical record of the U.S. courts in applying the
Lanham Act to foreign commerce is interesting. In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., the U.S. Supreme Court applied the Lanham
Act to the defendant, who made watches under a local trademark in Mexico, and subsequently sold them in the United
States in breach of the plaintiff’s mark.30 The court gave three
26. The majority of states adopt an analysis derived from the American
Law Institute’s Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 6 (1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]; SCOLES & HAY, supra
note 11, at 79–102.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1999).
28. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283–84 (1952).
29. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects of the Protection of
Trademarks, Paper Presented at the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Forum on Private International Law and Intellectual Property (Jan.
30–31, 2001) (WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIL/01/4 2001), available at http://
www.wipo.int/pil-forum/en/documents.
30. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. at 285.
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reasons for applying U.S. law: first, the defendant was an
American citizen and accordingly, Congress had wide power to
legislate with respect to his acts; second, the effects of the defendant’s conduct were felt in the United States, where some of
the infringing items were sold; and third, at the time of the
court hearing, the defendant had lost its Mexican trademark
rights so there no longer existed any conflict between U.S. and
foreign trademark rights.31
While courts in the pre-Internet era were cautious in giving
the Act an extraterritorial operation where the defendant was
not a U.S. citizen, the advent of new technologies appears to
have altered this position dramatically.32 Indeed, it should come
as no surprise that technology, which renders the difference
between the domestic and the foreign illusory,33 should expose
the limitations of the Bulova test. There is a much greater opportunity with the Internet for the domestic use of a trademark
to spill across borders and impact commerce elsewhere.34 Yet,
there seems to be no scope under Bulova to apply U.S. law
where the defendant is a foreign national and, in addition, in
the Internet context, it may be very difficult to precisely quantify the degree of harm on the plaintiff’s U.S. commerce.
Furthermore, the Bulova test draws no distinction between
the various types of trademark infringement in terms of the
defendant’s conduct and intent. Cyber-piracy arguably stands
apart from instances where a party merely uses a mark on the
Internet to expand into international markets. However, according to Bulova, principles of territorial connection are applied in a neutral fashion to determine the scope of operation of
U.S. trademark law, without regard to whether the defendant
31. Id. at 286–89.
32. In the majority of U.S. decisions not involving Internet infringement,
courts have been reluctant to grant relief under the Lanham Act unless the
defendant is a U.S. citizen and there is a substantial effect on U.S. commerce.
See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 643–44 (2d Cir.
1956) (refusing to apply the Act where the U.S. owner of a U.S. mark sought
to restrain the use of the mark in Canada by a Canadian resident who owned
the Canadian registration for the same mark and was selling similar products
there).
33. See generally Uta Kohl, Eggs, Jurisdiction and the Internet, 51 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 555 (2002) (discussing the limitations of the Bulova test).
34. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199,
1240–42 (1998).
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was acting in good faith or abusively. Given that bad faith use
of marks has increased enormously since the advent of the
Internet, a test based on pure territorial connection is outdated
and inadequate.35 The Bulova principle does remain useful,
however, where a defendant only intends to use a mark within
a limited geographical area, and has acquired local rights’ protection for that purpose. It would be unjust if such a person
were unduly penalized for unforeseeable and uncontrollable
spillover of its use into other states.
Not surprisingly then, U.S. courts have responded to the rise
of cybersquatting by extending the scope of the Lanham Act so
that it may apply to both foreign and U.S. defendants, even
where there has been a less than substantial effect on U.S.
commerce. The courts appear to have decided that a bad faith
user has, by virtue of its conduct, forfeited any right to exemption from the application of U.S. trademark law.36 Unfortunately though, in the judiciary’s enthusiasm to catch cybersquatters through expansive application of U.S. law, some “collateral damage” has occurred. In particular, there have been
cases where a foreign entity, with little or no connection to the
United States, using its mark in good faith within its territory,
has been held subject to the Lanham Act.37
In one notorious case, Cable News Network L.P. v.
CNNews.com,38 a Chinese resident who registered a domain
name for a site accessible in the United States was found to be
subject to the Act, despite the fact that his site was a news ser35. To some extent, this outcome is a result of the policies adopted by
ICANN for registration in the generic top-level domains, such as (.com), where
domains have been allocated on a “first come, first served” basis without any
regard for whether the registrant has a right to use such a name under
trademark law. See ICANN, Top-Level Domains, at http://www.icann.org/tlds
(last visited Mar. 16, 2005). This approach is in contrast to the procedure
adopted in most national registries for the grant of country-level domains,
which require some prior connection between the registrant and the name.
See, e.g., infra note 65.
36. See, e.g., Hollywood Entertainment Corp. v. Hollywood Entertainment,
Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6466, *11 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 1999); see also Toys
“R” Us, Inc. v. Abir, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22431, *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
1997).
37. See, e.g., Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp.
2d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 177 F.
Supp. 2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d in part, 56 Fed. Appx. 599 (4th Cir. 2003).
38. Cable News Network L.P., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 517–18.
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vice entirely in the Chinese language, with 99.5% of its users
located in Chinese cities, and which transacted no business
within the United States. The court applied the Act for a number of reasons. Generally, it argued the Act was applicable because of the global nature of the Internet. It also found the significant number of Chinese speakers in the United States, and
the fact that the (.com) domain is essentially an American toplevel domain, to be relevant. Last, it noted that CNN is an internationally famous mark. In the court’s view, the accessibility of the mark in the United States and, accordingly, the risk of
confusion with the plaintiff’s mark, created an effect on U.S.
commerce.39
This case is problematic because there was no evidence that
any Chinese speakers in the United States knew of the site, let
alone accessed it, and so the risk of confusion with the U.S.
mark seemed minute. In addition, the case did not reveal bad
faith use on the part of the defendant: he conducted an almost
exclusively local business within China, in the Chinese language, and directed his business at many people who, likely,
were not aware of the U.S. company’s mark.40
In such a case, there is a good argument for applying the Bulova principles to shield the foreign defendant from U.S. law, in
the same way that U.S. jurisdictional principles have been applied to protect foreign interests in international trademark
litigation.41 Such an application would accord with the views of
European scholars who have advocated a “co-existence” approach to cross-border Internet trademark disputes.42 Under
such a doctrine, only where the foreign user is making an “unfair use” of the mark, such as by cybersquatting, blatant imitation, or intentional confusion, would the use be prohibited.43
39. Id.
40. Note that on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
expressly vacated the District Court’s finding that the defendant had engaged
in bad faith. Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 56 Fed. Appx. 599,
603 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished).
41. See supra, Part I.A.
42. See, e.g., Torsten Bettinger & Dorothee Thum, Territorial Trademark
Rights in the Global Village--International Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and
Substantive Law for Trademark Disputes on the Internet (Part One) 31 IIC
162 (2000) and (Part Two) 31 IIC 285 (2000).
43. Id. at 300–02. See also WIPO, Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks and Other Industrial Property Rights in
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Such a view recognizes the legitimate competing interests of
mark-holders and denies the right of a state to unilaterally impose its law outside of the bad faith context. The United States,
however, has not chosen to follow the co-existence approach.
Rather, it responded to the cyber-piracy problem by enacting
ACPA. The effect of this legislation on cross-border Internet
trademark litigation is considered in the next section.
III. THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
(ACPA)
ACPA is a globally unique piece of legislation in at least two
respects. First, the Act creates a new statutory tort of cyberpiracy whereby a trademark owner may bring an action against
a person who has registered a domain name with the bad faith
intent to profit from the mark.44 Second, ACPA creates a new
basis of in rem jurisdiction for trademark owners.45 As an alternative to bringing a personal action against a defendant, the
plaintiff may proceed in rem against the offending domain
name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar or domain name registry is located. This in rem jurisdiction is available for cyber-piracy, trademark infringement, and
dilution claims.
The in rem jurisdiction provision is especially significant because Verisign, the exclusive worldwide registry for all domain
names in the (.com), (.org) and (.net) top-level domains, is located in Virginia. Hence, even though registrars exist in other
states and have the authority to allocate these top-level domains, Verisign retains the ability to transfer ownership or cancel a name. Consequently, a holder of a U.S. trademark will be
able to use in rem jurisdiction to sue a top-level domain in Vir-

Signs, on the Internet, Arts. 2 & 3, available at http://www.wipo.int/aboutip/en/development_iplaw/pub845.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) (allowing a
defendant to make a “restrained use” of a mark, which means any use other
than one intended to have a “commercial effect” in a country); Annette Kur,
Use of Trademarks on the Internet: the WIPO Recommendations 33 IIC 41, 43–
46 (2002).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (1999).
45. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
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ginia regardless of the location of the registrar from which the
name was allocated.46
Two preliminary comments should be made about the legislation. First cyber-piracy, as was mentioned above, is one of the
least defensible forms of trademark infringement. Consequently, a strong case exists for broad application of U.S. law to
foreign infringers to deter and punish such conduct. Second,
the drafters of ACPA appear to have been concerned not only
with the difficulty of establishing personal jurisdiction, but also,
the serious problem of enforcement of U.S. court orders. Enforcement is difficult because the relief typically sought in
trademark infringement cases is an injunction requiring a defendant to cease the infringing activity, and such relief is rarely
capable of recognition and enforcement as a foreign judgment.47
It is arguable that the effect of ACPA in rem jurisdiction in
cyber-piracy cases involving the top-level domain names is to
establish the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia as the exclusive global forum for such disputes and the
Lanham Act as the exclusive applicable law. While some commentators have rejected this outcome as undesirable in all cases
of trademark infringement,48 the present author sees justification for a wide application of U.S. law in the context of abusive
uses and registrations. Given the problem of enforcement mentioned above, the ACPA approach, which completely dispenses
with any need to consider foreign interests or elements in the
litigation before applying U.S. law, is clearly valid in cases
where egregious or bad faith infringement has occurred. Moreover, it is important to note that the in rem provisions of the
statute do not apply in all Internet trademark cases, for example where the defendant has a domain registered in the coun46. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I)–(II) (The right to proceed in rem, however, also
depends upon the mark owner showing (a) that personal jurisdiction would
not be available over a person who would have been a defendant in the civil
action; or (b) through due diligence that it has not been able to find a person
who would have been a defendant.).
47. See, e.g., UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3
(1962) (in force in thirty states).
48. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The Digital Trademark Right: A Troubling
New Extraterritorial Reach of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REV. 483, 487
(2003); Steven J. Coran, Note, The Anticybersquatting Protection Act’s In Rem
Provision: Making American Trademark Law the Law of the Internet?, 30
HOFSTRA L. REV. 169, 170 (2001).
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try-level domain of another nation. In such a case, the U.S.
trademark owner who wishes to bring an action in the United
States against a foreign defendant for trademark infringement,
must satisfy both the rules of personal jurisdiction and the territorial scope of the Lanham Act, which means that there is
scope for recognition of foreign interests in such cases.
On the other hand, the use of ACPA against an innocent foreign defendant, who uses a mark in good faith and is protected
under its local law, is oppressive and does not adequately weigh
the interests of the local plaintiff and foreign defendant. It may
be said in response that the territorial restrictions of the
Lanham Act must still be satisfied in cases other then cyberpiracy. For example, where the defendant used the mark in
U.S. commerce, recent cases show how slim the contact with the
United States can be for U.S. law to apply.49 In situations of
genuine good faith use, the application of ACPA may lead to
injustice.
A. ACPA Applied to Cyber-Piracy Cases
In cyber-piracy cases, the exercise of in rem jurisdiction under
ACPA has been effective in ceasing the use of domain names
registered by foreign-based defendants, particularly where such
persons had little or no connection to the United States.50 The
threshold requirement for in rem jurisdiction, that a plaintiff
show that jurisdiction does not exist over the person of the registrant, also seems easy to satisfy. For example, in BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, the court barely referred
to personal jurisdiction at all, simply noting that the plaintiff
was unable to serve the domain name registrant because he
was a foreign resident.51
Despite the legitimacy of applying the in rem provisions of
ACPA to cyber-piracy cases, there are signs that some foreign
courts and domain name registrars are resenting its applica-

49. Cable News Network L.P., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 517–18. See also Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824, 833 (N.D. Ill.
2000).
50. See, e.g., Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d
860, 868–69 (E.D. Va. 2000); BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106
F. Supp. 2d 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
51. BroadBridge Media, L.L.C., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
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tion, particularly where the defendant is a local party with little
or no connection to the United States. While this reaction suggests something of a foreign backlash against perceived unilateral application of U.S. law, it may also be said that foreign authorities could be doing more to ensure that their local residents
do not engage in deliberate conduct that harms U.S. trademark
owners.
In GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com,52 a U.S. mark
owner obtained an order in an ACPA in rem suit directing a
Korean registrar to transfer a domain name belonging to a Korean registrant to the U.S. owner on the ground that the name
violated its U.S. trademark rights.53 The Korean registrant
then obtained an order from the Korean court restraining the
registrar from transferring the name on the basis that the U.S.
court lacked jurisdiction to make such an order. The U.S. court
responded by ordering Verisign to cancel the domain name.
The court noted that although the Korean registrant had no
contacts with the United States, the Korean registrar was in
breach of its contract with Verisign by refusing to transfer the
name. In addition, the court noted that ACPA in rem jurisdiction had an important policy justification: catching foreignregistered domain names in the top-level domain that infringe
upon U.S. trademarks. Were ACPA in rem jurisdiction not to
exist, such conduct could not be prevented.54 In fact, the court
felt that ACPA did not go far enough because foreign registrants could circumvent its provisions by registering domain
names with local registrars within their respective countrylevel domains.55 The court appeared to lament the fact that
such names are currently out of reach of the U.S. courts.56
GlobalSantaFe is a good example of why ACPA is needed:
had it not existed, the U.S. trademark owner would have struggled to obtain personal jurisdiction over a party who was blatantly infringing upon its rights. In addition, it seems clear
from the facts that even if a U.S. court had found jurisdiction to
exist and issued an order requiring the defendant to cease use,
52. See generally GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com, 250 F. Supp.
2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003).
53. Id. at 612.
54. Id. at 623.
55. Id. at 624.
56. Id. at 625.
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it is very likely that the Korean court would not have enforced
the order. Tension between courts and administrative authorities in different countries should be avoided, occasionally, however, it will have to be endured to protect a trademark owner’s
rights. While such action may also lead to other states enacting
their own version of ACPA,57 if the scope of such legislation is
limited to bad faith and abusive uses of marks, there is likely to
be little damage to the international trademark system.
A similar comment may be made about the case America
Online, Inc. v. AOL.org.58 In that decision, the court ordered the
Public Interest Registry in Virginia to transfer a domain name
to a U.S. corporation, where a foreign registrar had refused to
do so in violation of an earlier U.S. court order.59 In fact, the
Chinese registrar transferred the domain name to another registrar in South Korea in an attempt to avoid enforcement of the
judgment upon one of its offices in California.60
Although the decision in America Online is an appropriate
application of ACPA to that claim, the court also made some
general comments on the operation of ACPA that are problematic, at least when applied outside the cybersquatting context.
The court noted that foreign registrants, by choosing a top-level
domain to register a domain name, had
chose[n], in effect to play Internet ball in American cyberspace. Had they wished to avoid an American ACPA suit and
transfer order and American jurisdiction altogether, they
might have chosen to register the infringing domain name in
top-level domains with solely foreign registries and registrars
… [R]egistrants choosing the “.org” top-level domain must
know, or reasonably should have known, that the controlling
registry for that domain is a U.S. entity located in Virginia
and that, under the ACPA, a federal court in Virginia would
ultimately have jurisdiction over any name registered in the
61
“.org” top-level domain.

57. Zohar Efroni, A Barcelona.com Analysis: Toward a Better Model for
Adjudication of International Domain Name Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 29, 90 (2003).
58. See generally America Online, Inc. v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449
(E.D. Va. 2003).
59. Id. at 449.
60. Id. at 452–53.
61. Id. at 457.
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The court appears to be saying that registration of a domain
name in the top-level amounts to de facto submission to U.S.
jurisdiction and law. The correctness of this view is questionable given that the only dispute resolution process a registrant
clearly submits to at the time of registration is the Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), which is included as a term
in the registration agreement for the generic top-level domains.62 It is likely that most registrants would simply be unaware of the application of ACPA, particularly those who registered names prior to its enactment in 1999. It seems a stretch
to say that such persons have submitted to U.S. law and jurisdiction—rather, it appears that U.S. law has been imposed on
them.
B. ACPA Applied to Good Faith Infringements
Where an action is brought under ACPA against a defendant
who is making a good faith use of a mark, application of its provisions is particularly problematic, as is shown by
CNNews.com, discussed above.63 In CNNews.com, there was no
finding that the defendant sought to do business in the United
States, or that it used the mark in bad faith, yet it was held
subject to in rem jurisdiction and stripped of its domain name.64
It could be said that ACPA would not stop the defendant from
registering a domain name in the Chinese country-level domain. Such an outcome, however, is at odds with the philosophy of the domain name system, which is to encourage global

62. See, for example, the clause provided by the registrar 2Tone Domain
Registration Service, Customer Registration Agreement, at http://
www.2tonedomains.com/site/docs/agreement.php (Mar. 14, 2005):
6. DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE POLICY. If you reserved or registered
a domain name through us, or transferred a domain name to us from
another registrar, you agree to be bound the Dispute Policy which is
incorporated herein and made a part of this Agreement by reference.
The current version of the Dispute Policy may be found at our web
site: http://www.icann.org/udrp/urdp.htm. Please take the time to
familiarize yourself with such policy.
Id.
63. See generally Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp.
2d 506 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d in part, 56 Fed. Appx. 599 (4th Cir. 2003) (ACPA
applied despite slim contacts with the United States).
64. Id.
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use of the generic top-level domains, so that parties can use the
Internet to reach new markets with their goods and services.65
If the generic top-level domains were reserved exclusively for
U.S. trademark owners, then limiting the defendant to a Chinese registry may have been appropriate.66 The U.S. court,
however, saw the case as entirely one of protecting the interests
of the local trademark owner even though in this case the degree of harm to the party was very slight. Perhaps the court
felt a sense of deference to the plaintiff given the international
profile and goodwill of its brand. Nevertheless, the decision is a
regrettable application of ACPA.
Two other ACPA in rem cases that did not involve cyberpiracy on the part of the defendant may be similarly criticized.
In Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona,67 the registrant of a domain name, who was a Spanish citizen but operated a U.S. shelf company (hosted on a Spanish
server), sought a declaration under ACPA that its use of the
name did not infringe any trademark rights of the Spanish defendant, the Barcelona City Council. The provision relied upon
was the so-called “reverse domain name hijacking” provision of
ACPA, which allows a domain name owner to sue to recover its
domain name when a trademark owner has exceeded its author65. Note that ICANN has described un-sponsored, generic top-level domains (which includes the .com domain) as operating “under policies established by the global Internet community directly through the ICANN process….” Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), at http://www.icann.org/tlds (last visited
Mar. 17, 2005). This statement supports the view that the .com domain was
intended for global, not merely American, use. In addition, the Generic Top
level Domain Memorandum of Understanding (February 28, 1997) refers to
the generic TLDs as “global name resources” which require administration by
a “global distribution of registrars.” Establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding on the Generic Top Level Domain Name Space of the Internet
Domain Name System (gTLD-MoU), at http://www.gtld-mou.org (last visited
Mar. 17, 2005).
66. For example, in Australia, the domain name registrar for the (.com.au)
domain will only allocate a domain to an entity that has a commercial connection with Australia and some trademark or business association with the
name. In effect, a registrant under the Australian system must be linked to
the country and have a genuine intent to do business under that name. Domain Name Eligibility and Allocation Rules for the Open 2LDs (2002-07), at
http://www.auda.org.au/policies/auda-2002-07 (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
67. See generally Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de
Barcelona, 189 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev’d, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir.
2003).

File: Garnett MACRO.06.08.05.doc

2005]

Created on: 6/8/2005 1:36 PM

Last Printed: 6/8/2005 3:26 PM

TRADEMARKS AND THE INTERNET

943

ity by having the name suspended or transferred in arbitration
proceedings, for example, under the UDRP.68 Here, the Spanish
mark owner had previously been successful via UDRP proceedings in having the name transferred to it.69
The U.S. District Court in Barcelona.com refused the registrant’s claim for a declaration, holding that the domain name
infringed upon the City Council’s rights under Spanish trademark law.70 However, the Fourth Circuit reversed this decision,
holding that foreign trademark law was irrelevant to a registrant’s suit to recover a domain name under ACPA.71 According
to the court, U.S. trademark law had exclusive operation in
such a case, and since the word “Barcelona” was not protected
under U.S. law, the registrant was entitled to keep the domain
name.
The first interesting point about the case is that it was the
domain name registrant who brought the action to overcome an
unfavorable UDRP decision that labeled it a cybersquatter.
Consequently, the case would seem to encourage cybersquatters
(whether U.S. or foreign) to use ACPA against legitimate foreign mark owners. This outcome is rather ironic given that the
original purpose of ACPA was to deter cyber-piracy.
Second, the dispute at issue had almost no connection with
the United States: it involved two Spanish entities, concerned a
Spanish city, and was hosted on a Spanish server. While the
UDRP found for the City Council on the basis of Spanish law,
the Fourth Circuit ignored this finding on the basis that only
U.S. law was relevant. Surely this was a case where, under
U.S. choice of law principles, a court would have considered that
it had no interest in applying U.S. law given the lack of any
meaningful U.S. connections.72 This case suggests that a review
of ACPA is required to prevent U.S. law from being unilaterally
and exorbitantly applied.73

68. See Remedies; Infringement; Innocent Infringement by Printers and
Publishers, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v) (1999); UDRP, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
69. Barcelona.com, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d at 370–71.
70. Id. at 372, 376.
71. Barcelona.com, Inc., 330 F.3d at 628.
72. See supra, Part II.A.
73. See, e.g., Efroni, supra note 57, at 85–91, 117.
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The most recent ACPA decision against a foreign defendant,
Hawes v. Network Solutions, Inc., also involved an action by a
U.S. domain name registrant against a foreign trademark
owner in circumstances where the registrant appeared to have
engaged in cybersquatting.74 The difference between this case
and Barcelona.com, however, is that the foreign trademark
owner had obtained a judgment for infringement from a foreign
court. Hawes concerned a U.S. plaintiff who registered the domain name “lorealcomplaints.com” with Network Solutions, Inc.
(NSI) in 1999.75 L’Oreal, a French corporation, sued Hawes for
trademark infringement in France, and, after NSI produced the
registration certificate to the French court, the court ordered
the transfer of the domain name to L’Oreal.76 Hawes then sued
L’Oreal in Virginia under the reverse domain name hijacking
provision of ACPA, arguing that his use of the domain name
was not unlawful, and requesting that it be transferred back to
him.
The Fourth Circuit allowed the plaintiff’s claim but stated
that it did not want to “imply any disrespect of [the] French
court.”77 In its view, jurisdiction under ACPA was not qualified
or limited by the fact of pending actions in a foreign court in the
same way that UDRP proceedings would not preclude an ACPA
suit.78 Three comments may be made about this decision. First,
this case continues the trend, seen in CNNews.com and Barcelona.com, of allowing ACPA to be used by persons with no good
faith interest in the mark to attack the rights of foreign trademark owners. This trend is unfortunate and injurious to comity. Second, the court’s comment that the French proceeding
was merely “pending” is not strictly accurate; in fact the matter
had already been resolved.79 Arguably, at the time the U.S. proceedings were filed, the interference with the French court’s
process was even greater. It was not as if both parties had filed
conflicting actions in different countries at the same time or, as
in GlobalSantaFe, one party had filed retaliatory proceedings in
74.
2003).
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See generally Hawes v. Network Solutions, Inc., 337 F.3d 377 (4th Cir.
Id. at 379.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id.
Id. at 379.
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a foreign country after an ACPA action had been brought
against it.
The French court, seised first, had determined that a breach
of its trademark law had occurred and such judgment was entitled to deference in the United States on the ground of comity,
as occurs with most foreign judgments in U.S. courts.80 Instead,
the effect of allowing the ACPA action to proceed was to render
the foreign trademark rights practically useless, as the registrant was reinstated as owner of the domain name because his
registration did not infringe U.S. law.
Third, the Court drew a questionable analogy between foreign
court proceedings and UDRP actions. It stated that neither
proceeding was entitled to deference by a U.S. court when applying ACPA.81 The alleged similarity between these two types
of proceedings is misplaced, given that, in the case of UDRP
decisions, the UDRP Policy expressly provides that court proceedings may be brought to override a decision of a UDRP
panel.82 By contrast, there is no international agreement or policy that elevates the decisions of one national court above another in trademark litigation. Indeed, foreign courts issuing
judgments with respect to their own locally-granted trademarks
should be entitled to greater deference because they are pronouncing on matters that cannot be adjudicated by a U.S. court.
Indeed, as mentioned above, U.S. courts have historically and
routinely enforced foreign judgments on the basis of comity.83
This result is the strongest example to date of the trend of unilateral application of national law in the United States; this is
the first case where foreign trademark rights have been expressly overridden by application of ACPA.
C. Is ACPA Going in the Right Direction?
An effective revolution in thinking has occurred since Bulova
with respect to international trademark disputes. While Bu-

80. U.S. law has a long tradition of respect and comity towards judgments
of foreign countries. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). See also
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS ACT, supra note 47; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 26, § 98.
81. Hawes, 337 F.3d at 386.
82. UDRP, supra note 8, ¶ 3(b).
83. See supra note 80.
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lova and its progeny encouraged extreme deference to foreign
defendants in the application of U.S. trademark law, recent
practice has altered this position. It is clear that the Internet
has exposed the inadequacy of the Bulova criteria through the
penetration of the U.S. market by foreign marks and the emergence of practices such as cybersquatting. Such new developments clearly demand a greater willingness to reach persons
outside the United States with U.S. law than was previously
the case. Consequently, since ACPA came into force, courts
have applied U.S. trademark law more liberally to foreign defendants, a legitimate approach given the high prevalence of
cybersquatting in the generic top-level domains and the difficulty of enforcing court ordered injunctive relief in other countries. Where, however, the defendant has few contacts with the
United States and is carrying on business in good faith under
the mark, with a strong local orientation and backed by the protection of a local trademark, application of U.S. law through
ACPA is harder to justify.
This trend is noticeable in the CNNews.com case, as well as
in more recent decisions, such as Barcelona.com and Hawes,
where domain name owners who appear to have registered
names in suspicious circumstances have been allowed to keep
such names despite their breach of UDRP Policy or foreign
trademark rights.84 It would be ironic indeed if ACPA were to
lead U.S. courts to gain a reputation for facilitating cybersquatting against foreign trademark owners, yet this seems a clear
possibility under the current law, and a matter that requires
serious legislative attention in the United States.
Nevertheless, the view that ACPA should be repealed in favor
of increased deference to UDRP arbitration must be rejected.
First, while it is true that the UDRP does provide relief against
cyber-piracy, its decisions and procedures have been criticized.85
84. In Barcelona.com, Inc., a domain name owner was found by a UDRP
panel to have registered the name in bad faith. Barcelona.com, Inc., 189 F.
Supp. 2d at 373. In Hawes, a French Court found a domain name owner’s
registration to infringe a French trademark. Hawes, 337 F.3d at 379.
85. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control:
Lessons from the ICANN Dispute Resolution Process, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 191 (2002); Robert A. Badgley, Improving ICANN in Ten Easy Steps:
Ten Suggestions for ICANN to Improve its Anticybersquatting Arbitration
System, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 109, 113–14 (2001).
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Second, it may be argued that a U.S. trademark owner should
be entitled to invoke U.S. jurisdiction to gain redress under its
own law, particularly where deliberate and bad faith harm is
being caused. Furthermore, for a scheme of greater UDRP deference to work internationally, all states would have to sign a
treaty agreeing to limit grounds of domestic judicial review. In
the absence of such a treaty, national courts would retain the
power to overturn a UDRP decision at the expense, for example,
of a U.S. trademark owner’s rights.
As a final point, the recent decision in Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc.86 suggests that technology may now be available
to assist U.S. courts in curtailing the application of U.S. law in
Internet trademark cases. In Lindows.com, the availability of
inexpensive commercial software to block users according to
geographical location was noted.87 If such software is precise
and effective there seems to be no reason why U.S. courts cannot issue orders under ACPA with limited territorial effect.
That is, instead of forcing the registrant to transfer or cancel a
domain name, it could be entitled to use such a name in all
countries where it has rights of use and only precluded from
using the mark in the United States. Such an approach would
arguably balance the competing interests in cases of parallel
good faith use of marks in separate territories more effectively
than the current position under ACPA.
IV. TURNING THE TABLES: U.S. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
TRADEMARK RIGHTS
Another possible reason for the expansive application of U.S.
law in Internet trademark cases is that, traditionally, U.S.
courts have not enforced foreign trademark rights. In particular, they have not allowed a party to sue in the United States
for infringement or to question the validity of a foreignregistered mark. The main reason for this position was the “act
of state” doctrine, which maintains that a U.S. court does not
review the acts of foreign government officials acting within
their own territory because of the consequent danger of conflict

86. Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1223 (W.D.
Wash. 2004).
87. Id.
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between the court and the administrative and judicial officers of
the foreign state.88
Most courts examining infringement of foreign registered
trademarks have refused to entertain the claims.89 The decision
in Lindows.com, however, suggests a possible willingness to
reconsider this position.
In that matter, Microsoft had obtained an injunction in a Dutch court which restrained Lindows.com from selling and distributing its software in the
Netherlands and ordered it to render its site inaccessible to users in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.90 Microsoft
then filed a second suit in the Netherlands alleging that Lindows.com had failed to comply with the original order.91 Lindows.com approached the U.S. courts, seeking to enjoin Microsoft from pursuing the foreign litigation and seeking a
declaration that the Dutch order was unenforceable in the
United States.92
The court refused to grant both forms of relief because to do
so would amount to “[interference] with the judicial proceedings
of other sovereign nations.”93 The court noted that the Paris
Convention,94 to which the United States is a party, is premised
upon national trademark law having territorial, rather than
extraterritorial, operation. If the U.S. court granted the relief
sought, it would completely nullify the foreign trademark rights
and, in effect, superimpose U.S. law upon a foreign country.
Such a conclusion would not only be injurious to comity but also
to the holder of the foreign trademark rights, in this case Microsoft.

88. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401
(1964); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir.
1956).
89. See, e.g., Alcar Group, Inc. v. Corporate Performance Sys., Ltd., 109 F.
Supp. 2d 948, 952 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Cf. V & S Vin & Sprit Aktiebolag v. Hanson, 146 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (E.D. Va. 2001) (suggesting that it would have
jurisdiction to hear a claim in relation to a foreign trademark where a plaintiff
sought a worldwide injunction).
90. Lindows.com, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 1221.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1223.
94. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
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Lindows.com is a good example of respect for foreign trademark rights in the Internet context and should encourage U.S.
courts to rethink their traditional resistance to adjudicating
claims based on foreign-registered trademarks. The current
U.S. position is harder to justify as multi-territorial infringements of IP rights become increasingly common. For example,
a single Web site can infringe upon the trademark laws of many
states; it would be sensible for a plaintiff to be able to consolidate all of his claims in a single forum with significant savings
in time and costs.95
The current approach, perhaps unwittingly, encourages unilateral application of U.S. trademark law. Since a plaintiff
cannot secure recovery for infringements of its foreign marks
based on conduct outside the United States, a U.S. court may be
more easily persuaded by an injured rights-holder to “fill the
gap” by applying U.S. law to such conduct. Where the plaintiff
is a U.S. resident who would be forced to sue abroad to vindicate its foreign rights, this risk seems particularly great. The
record of U.S. courts in applying the Lanham Act to foreign defendants, particularly in Internet transactions, lends some support to this assertion. By contrast, if U.S. courts were to adopt
a more receptive approach to foreign trademark claims, in line
with the view of the court in the Lindows.com case, the incentive for unilateralist and extraterritorial application of national
law may diminish. As has been noted,96 wide and expansive
application of national trademark law is likely to be more injurious to relations with foreign states than adjudicating upon
foreign trademark rights.97

95. ALI PRINCIPLES, Draft No. 2, supra note 7, at 19, 61–64.
96. Dinwoodie, supra note 29, at 24.
97. It is also worth noting that while the act of state doctrine has been
routinely invoked in U.S. courts to justify refusal to adjudicate foreign trademark actions, the application of this principle here seems somewhat misplaced. Traditionally, this doctrine has been employed to prevent a court reviewing uniquely governmental and sovereign acts of a foreign state, for example the conduct of its national security or foreign policy. Clearly, in this
context, a state may understandably resent the intrusion and scrutiny of a
foreign court, but the determination as to whether a private party is entitled
to sue to protect registered trademark rights would seem much lower down
the scale of sensitivity.
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V. CONCLUSION
The “collision” between the national law of trademarks and
the borderless Internet domain name system has led to many
complex disputes before national courts. In an entirely domestic dispute—between two parties with places of business in the
same country, concerning local trademark rights—questions of
personal jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement of judgments do not arise. The introduction of the cross-border element, however, creates problems for domestic courts. Not only
should the interest of the foreign party be taken into account
but also the interest of foreign states, when the forum court’s
holding may encroach upon their jurisdictional and legislative
competence.
In some decisions, great respect has been paid to the foreign
interests implicated in the litigation, but in other cases courts
have assumed jurisdiction or applied local law in almost
mechanistic fashion with little regard for the foreign dimension.
This unilateralist tendency is justified in the case of abusive
and bad faith conduct by foreign users of marks, but is much
less acceptable where the user is simply pursuing a genuine,
parallel business under the mark in another country. This latter situation, which appears to be the most common type of
cross-border Internet trademark dispute, calls for restraint and
sensitivity in assumption of jurisdiction and application of local
law. Recent technological developments may be available to
help courts in this respect by encouraging them to give a limited
territorial effect to any orders they impose. Such an approach,
based on respect for foreign interests and rights, would seem
both necessary and desirable, at least until a truly global
trademark regime emerges.

